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In trod u ction
Discussing United States repatriation of foreign earnings raises the issue of the 
repatriation tax. The repatriation tax is a tax the federal government places on foreign earnings 
when the earnings are repatriated. In 2004 there was a tax holiday that allowed for the lowering 
of the repatriation tax rate to incentivize multinational companies to repatriate their foreign 
earnings. After the tax holiday many different groups have discussed how to best address the 
U.S. current economic problems through the implementation of another tax holiday, a penalizing 
tax holiday, or changing the U.S. tax system.
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P roject P rop osal
Reason for Interest:
I chose this topic because of my interest in transfer pricing. Once I understood how 
corporations were storing their earnings in foreign countries to avoid paying higher taxes on that 
revenue through transfer pricing I became curious to see if there was any other way that 
corporations could avoid paying taxes on those earnings. This curiosity led me to investigate 
international tax concepts. After some initial research I decided that I wanted to understand why 
the United States with its current federal deficit is not trying to tax those earnings that are being 
stored in corporations’ foreign subsidiaries. With the current state of the United States economy 
and the current unemployment rate I wanted to know why the government does not try to 
incentivize corporations to return those earnings and reinvest into the United States economy 
instead of abroad.
Prior Coursework and Experience:
• Introduction to Financial Accounting, Introduction to Cost Management, Accounting 
Information Systems, Intermediate Cost Management, Accounting Career Planning 
Seminar, Financial Reporting I, Assurance services, Financial Reporting II, and Taxation 
of Business Entities and Individuals
• ELC Project for Motorola Mobility in which we wrote a formal report for our 
recommendation
• MKTG 325 research paper evaluating whether there is a benefit for companies to have 
their commercial volume higher than the volume of the television program.
• MGMT 346 a formal report with a group of six people reviewing the most effective 
method of recruiting and hiring a new employee
• HIST 111 research paper in which I reviewed whether or not there was a military 
revolution.
Description of work proposed:
The objective of my research is to get some perspective on the lost tax revenue because 
of corporations retaining their revenues in their foreign subsidiaries to avoid having to pay higher 
tax on them if they were to be returned to the United States. The second object is to research why
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the 2004 “tax holiday” was not as beneficial as originally intended in terms of stimulating the 
U.S. economy and creating jobs. The third and most important objective would be to identify a 
way of addressing the issue of repatriating foreign earnings that is beneficial for both 
corporations and the United States government which will stimulate the economy and create jobs 
for Americans.
Research Methodology:
I started my research by learning how resources are taxed when they are transferred from 
a foreign subsidiary to the corporation’s headquarters in the United States. The next step was to 
research Fortune 100 companies’ notes to financial statements reviewing what they say about 
their handling of offshore earnings. Once I reviewed their financial statements I gained an 
understanding of the extent that corporations are utilizing this process to avoid paying taxes on 
their earnings. The next step was to research what the United States has already done to persuade 
corporations to return their earnings to the United States. I utilized the United States Department 
of Treasury as a source of information because it has many articles and publications concerning 
topics of revenue from foreign subsidiaries. Lastly, I researched what might convince 
corporations to reinvest resources in the United States instead of their foreign subsidiaries. I 
evaluated the pros and cons of each alternative, the reasons for their failure or success, and why 
if successful why are they no longer in place.
Combination of Source Content
Cash Stored Abroad
Tax repatriation is a controversial topic because multinational companies do not feel it is 
right that they are taxed for money earned in another country that has nothing to do with United 
States operations. The other viewpoint is that multinational companies are purposefully investing 
abroad to avoid United States taxes by using technicalities in the tax code. The research on this 
subject revealed three important issues.
First, the cumulative amount of cash that is stored abroad in foreign subsidiaries by 
multinationals is in the trillions of dollars. Multinational companies like Apple, Pfizer, Cisco, 
Google and many others could owe billions of dollars in repatriation taxes (WSP, 2013). A
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recent article describes how Fortune 500 corporations are sending billions of dollars into foreign 
subsidiaries (tax shelters) to avoid paying U.S. taxes (Cohn, 2013).
The second issue is the extent to which multinational companies will go to avoid paying 
these taxes. Multinationals are using technicalities in the tax code to avoid paying these taxes. 
The IRS has implemented regulations to close the more common technicalities multinational 
firms are using; but there are still some techniques multinational companies are using to avoid 
paying taxes on foreign earnings (Rubin, 2012). I discuss these techniques in more detail later in 
the paper.
The third issue concerns multinational companies accepting lower returns to avoid paying 
repatriation taxes. Multinational companies are investing in projects, accepting lower return on 
investment (ROI) in a foreign country instead of investing in the United States and paying the 
repatriation tax (Fleischer, 2012). Multinational companies feel American-based corporations are 
at a significant disadvantage against other global companies based in other countries because of 
the United States tax system (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin, 2010). Some are claiming the only 
way multinational companies can return foreign earnings profitability is by reporting negative 
net income which results in a tax refund. When the multinational company repatriates the 
earnings the tax refund will be offset by the payment of the tax on the foreign earnings (Savitz, 
2012).
Summary of 2004 Tax Holiday
In 2004 President Bush implemented a tax holiday called the American Jobs Creation Act 
(AJCA), under which multinational companies could return their foreign earnings to the U.S. 
subject to a 5.25% tax instead of the traditional 35%. The objective of the Act was for 
multinational companies to invest in the U.S. economy and create jobs. The experts on the 
subject of the 2004 tax holiday agree that it failed to accomplish its main objective of creating 
jobs and stimulating the economy (Blouin and Krull, 2011). There were many reasons for the 
AJCA failure.
The first and probably unforeseen mistake was that policy makers did not consider the 
fact that multinational firms could use the repatriated money for investments that were already 
planned and the freed up money for debt payoff, stock repurchases and shareholder payouts, 
which was specifically forbidden by the act. A study claims that for every dollar repatriated sixty 
to ninety-two cents were used as a payout to shareholders. The second mistake with the tax
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holiday was that it had no way to verify if jobs were created and no method of punishing 
companies for inappropriately using funds. The third mistake was politicians failed to consider 
that companies could use the repatriated funds to create jobs, but that multinational companies 
would also use the funds to acquire companies and layoff those acquired employees leading to a 
negative “net” job creation ratio. The fourth consideration politicians did not take into account 
when they made the law is the multinational companies that lobbied the most for the holiday 
would not have spent millions of dollars on lobbying efforts if the companies did not expect to 
have a substantial return from their investment (Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes, 2010).
The short-term effects of the holiday were a return of $292 billion to the United States. 
Of that amount, 20.87% was used for stock repurchases (Blouin and Krull, 2011). The tax 
holiday provided the country with needed tax revenue, but in the long-run it was detrimental to 
the country. The problem, some believe, is that the tax holiday created an incentive for 
multinational companies to invest abroad and wait for another tax holiday to repatriate funds.
Ideas for Handling Tax Repatriation
The discussion of taxes always creates passionate responses by both individuals and 
corporations because of the influences they have on both groups’ decisions. The current debate 
in Congress over tax reform is at a standstill because Republicans want a complete overhaul of 
the tax code while Democrats want tax cuts, in a simple very broad view (Cook, 2011). The first 
idea is from John Klotsche, a former tax partner and senior advisor for the IRS commission from 
2003-2008. He suggests implementing another tax holiday similar to the 2004 holiday, except 
clarifying the language ensuring verifiable net job creation and accountability inspiring support 
from Republicans, Democrats, and corporate America (Klotsche, 2011).
The second idea which is being evaluated by President Obama is to change the United 
States tax system into a modified territorial system (Dixon, 2013). A territorial system works by 
characterizing the only revenue on a U.S. tax return as revenue earned in the U.S. (Lokken, 
2006). For example, assume Company ABC is a multinational company which earns revenue in 
both Ireland and the United States. The Ireland facility earns revenue in Ireland, and that revenue 
and subsequent deductions are only deductible on Ireland’s tax return. The revenue and 
deductions of Company ABC that relate to Ireland will not be on the company’s U.S. tax return. 
Also, the income tax Company ABC already paid in Ireland will not be deductible from its U.S. 
taxes.
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The third idea is the creation of a world-wide system. The benefit this system would 
create is that it would persuade multinational corporations to invest in the United States for a 
higher return on investment (ROI) because the multinational companies could no longer hide 
their money abroad. The new system would tax money once earned instead of when returned to 
the U.S. which means multinational companies would no longer have an incentive to invest 
abroad and wait for a tax holiday because the money would have already been taxed by the U.S. 
(Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, 2009).
The last idea is by David Cay Johnston, a writer for the New York Times who won a 
Pulitzer for his reporting of loopholes and inequities in the U.S. tax code. He proposed his idea in 
October of 2011. His method was to inspire multinational companies to repatriate funds from 
2010 and earlier by taxing all funds repatriated back to the U.S. at 50% unless returned by 
December 31, 2011 at the standard 35% (Johnston, 2011). This idea is two years old, but it can 
be updated to be applied today.
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E arnings S tored  A broad and th e  E ffects on  U.S. Tax R even u es
It is common knowledge that the federal government operates at a deficit. The 2012 
federal deficit was $1,089 trillion (Younglai, 2012). Agustino Fontevecchia, an author for 
Forbes, states the 2012 cash stored abroad by multinational companies has reached $1.45 trillion 
(Fontevecchia, 2013). Multinational companies’ tax strategies are preventing the federal 
government from collecting the extra revenue on this cash. If the foreign earnings were 
repatriated it would not eliminate the federal deficit, but it would decrease it. Assuming the $1.45 
trillion in earnings are repatriated at the standard 35% the federal government would receive 
$507.5 billion. This would decrease the federal deficit to 581.5 billion, assuming there is no 
change in spending or revenues which is unrealistic.
The Problem-Techniques Used to Shift Earnings
The federal government understands that multinational companies are going to 
implement strategies to lower their tax liability. Multinational companies use techniques allowed 
by the tax code to lower their tax liability. The following two techniques are those that 
multinational companies use often. The first of the three techniques involves U.S. companies 
selling a patent to foreign subsidiaries to avoid tax by the U.S. The second technique 
implemented is a U.S. company uses the money in a foreign subsidiary to buy a company in the 
U.S. and reorganize the purchased company outside the U.S. (Rubin, 2012).
Qualcomm is a multinational company that used the selling of patents to increase its 
funds overseas while maintaining a low tax liability. Qualcomm created a foreign subsidiary in 
Bermuda, which has no corporate income tax. Qualcomm’s Bermuda subsidiary will buy a 
patent that has not started to return significant profits. Once the patent becomes extremely 
profitable, Qualcomm’s U.S. based corporation will have to pay large royalties to the Bermuda 
subsidiary for the use of the patent. This technique benefits Qualcomm in two important ways. 
The first benefit is that the royalties Qualcomm pays for the use of the patent are deductible on 
the U.S. corporate tax return. The second benefit is that the revenue Qualcomm receives from the 
royalty fees are not taxed in Bermuda and only taxed in the U.S. when repatriated. There is a 
negative component for Qualcomm with this process. The U.S. tax system imposes a tax on 
funds repatriated from foreign subsidiaries at 35%, but as long as those earnings stay abroad they 
are not taxed by the U.S. (Lawrence, J. 2013).
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The second technique is to use earnings trapped in a foreign subsidiary to purchase a 
company. This technique is a four-step operation.
1. Multinational company buys back its shares from a third party.
2. Perform stock swap to purchase a company.
3. Third party takes out loan to repurchase equivalent number of shares in company.
4. Repayment of third party’s loan by foreign earnings
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) is a multinational company that used this technique to 
increases its holdings while maintaining a low tax liability. Johnson and Johnson used Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, its Irish foreign subsidiary, to buy $12.9 billion in J&J shares from JPMorgan 
Chase and Goldman Sachs. J&J used the shares bought from JP Morgan Chase and Goldman 
Sachs in combination with some cash to buy Synthes, a Swiss medical device maker. JPMorgan 
Chase and Goldman Sachs borrowed $203.7 million to rebuy the same number of shares of J&J 
in the open market. Johnson & Johnson will repay JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs loan by 
using the earnings trapped in Janssen Pharmaceuticals its foreign subsidiary (Gara, 2012).
Ethics and Morality of Tax Policy
There are two main questions when considering the ethics and morality of tax policies for 
multinational companies.
The first main question would ask: is it right for multinational companies to spend 
millions of dollars to influence tax policy for laws in which they significantly benefit? Since 
2007, Qualcomm spent over six million dollars a year lobbying for another opportunity to return 
foreign earnings at a lower tax rate (Lawrence, J. 2013). Multinational companies’ use of their 
resources to influence tax policy is not illegal. The question some would ask is whether it is 
morally or ethically right for a multinational company to purposefully implement a strategy to 
achieve the lowest possible tax liability.
The second question would ask whether multinational companies are paying enough 
taxes in exchange for benefits provided by the federal government? There is an economic 
relationship between multinational companies and federal government. It is difficult to view the 
federal government as a member of an economic exchange. It is easy to see what multinational 
companies provide the federal government. Multinational companies provide two easily 
identifiable benefits to the federal government. The first benefit is multinational companies pay
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income taxes. The second benefit is that multinational companies employee people who pay 
income taxes.
Three important benefits that the federal government provides to multinational companies 
are companies offering securities to the public in the U.S. multinational companies’ actions, 
infrastructure, and public protection. Multinational companies are essentially receiving services 
from the federal government; some of the services are equality in financial reporting, 
government infrastructure, protection for employees, etc. When multinational companies employ 
strategies similar to those discussed above are they paying enough?
The second part of the second idea is the idea of a fair price for multinational companies 
to pay for the services they received from the federal government. Multinational companies are 
receiving a significant benefit from the federal government should they be paying more than the 
average citizen to be fair. An argument can be made that multinational companies through their 
employment of citizens and business activities are providing a greater benefit to the federal 
government which means they should be paying less to be fair. This summarizes the main idea 
behind this discussion who decides what is fair.
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C ost o f S torin g E arnings A broad
There are many multinational companies that have millions of dollars stored abroad. For 
a company to reach the top 50 list of earnings stored overseas the multinational company needs 
to have a “minimum of $4.9 billion, up 69% from 2006” (Fontevecchia, 2013). The top five 
multinational companies in terms of money stored abroad, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Pfizer, and 
Cisco Systems have a cumulative $347 billion in cash abroad (Fontevecchia, 2013). It is 
estimated that Apple alone will have $155 billion in cash trapped overseas by September 2013 
(WSP, 2013). A Citizen for Tax Justice (CTJ) report issued in December 2012, that 300 Fortune 
500 corporations have some earnings stored overseas. 47 of those corporations have disclosed 
that if they had to pay the taxes on their foreign earnings the amount of the tax would be $105 
billion (Cohn, 2013). In the last four years, 48 multinational companies have increased their 
foreign holdings by at least $3 billion, totaling $518 billion (Cohn, 2013). The discussion of 
untaxed foreign earnings trapped abroad is gaining in both importance and relevancy because of 
the rising federal deficit and amount of earnings trapped abroad.
As stated by Fontevecchia (2013), U.S. non-financial companies have $1.45 trillion in 
funds stored abroad as of 2012. We all know everything has a price. The question is what price 
are multinational companies paying to store these earnings abroad? The first price is access to 
the cash. Since these earnings are stored abroad and the earnings cannot be brought back to the 
U.S. without facing a 35% tax, multinational companies cannot use the earnings to invest in the 
U.S.
The second related price is that multinational companies are investing abroad and 
receiving a lower return on investment compared to investing in the U.S., (Graham, Hanlon, and 
Shevlin 2010). A decision to invest in a project has many different evaluation criteria. For a 
multinational company to willingly accept a lower return on investment (ROI) and potential 
damage to its public image, the repatriation tax must be a significant factor in the decision 
criteria. Lower ROIs are not the only consequences multinational companies are willing to face 
to avoid the repatriation tax. Multinational companies are not only accepting lower returns on 
their investments to avoid paying the repatriation tax, but also nine percent are claiming they are 
willing to sell a segment or even the company to avoid the repatriation tax (Graham, Hanlon, and 
Shevlin, 2010).
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The third price is that multinational companies are increasing their debt financing to 
avoid returning the earnings and pay the repatriation tax. Survey results from Graham, Hanlon, 
and Shevlin’s study reveal that 44% of multinational companies have issued debt to finance a 
project to avoid paying the repatriation tax (2010). Multinational companies will not willingly 
increase their debt to equity ratio or interest coverage ratio to avoid paying a tax unless that tax 
was a substantial cost, because the more debt a company incurs the higher the interest rate. The 
second problem with debt financing is that it can raise shareholder’s concern about both the 
profitability and sustainability of a multinational company. Shareholders are probably aware that, 
if the multinational company goes bankrupt, lenders [debt financiers] have first claims on any 
earnings. Multinational companies need to find a more effective solution to repatriation because 
they are trapping millions of dollars abroad.
2 0 0 4  Tax H oliday
In 2004, President Bush signed into law the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), 
commonly referred to as the 2004 tax holiday. The purpose of the law was to inspire “U.S. 
multinational [companies] to pay bigger cash dividends from their overseas subsidiaries and use 
the cash to make investments in the United States. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that it 
increased U.S. investment or jobs, and it cost tax payers billions” (Mundaca, 2011).
Why the Tax Holiday Failed
Hindsight evaluation has provided two reasons for the AJCA’s failure. The first reason 
for the failure of the AJCA is the vagueness in the wording of the law. The vagueness created 
three important problems: no verifiable job creation, manipulation of cash and increased 
shareholder payout. As stated above, the purpose of the tax holiday was to create jobs. The 
problem was that “the program failed to ensure that investments were made in new projects” 
(Bloink, 2012). Multinational companies used some of the funds returned to invest domestically 
by acquiring companies and firing the acquired companies’ employees. Bloink documents in 
Table 1 the multinational companies that benefited the most from the 2004 tax holiday and the 







Table 1: Repatriated vs. Layoffs
Dollars Repatriated Layoffs 2005-2006
Pfizer $37 billion 10,000
Merck $15.9 billion 7,000
Hewlett-Packard $14.5 billion 14,500
Honeywell $2.7 billion 2,000
Ford $900 million 30,000
Colgate-Palmolive $800 million 30,000
Total $1.7701 billion 93,500
Source: Bloink (2012)
The second reason for the failure had to do with the “fungibility” of cash (Dharmapala, 
Foley, & Forbes, 2010). The AJCA required that cash repatriated be used for “‘permitted 
investments’, which included hiring U.S. workers, U.S. investment, R&D, and certain 
acquisitions” (Dharmapala, Foley, & Forbes, 2010). Many multinational companies abided by 
the AJCA by using the repatriated funds to invest in projects that met the requirements of the 
AJCA. The problem was that the investments were investments that were already planned to 
happen with domestic earnings. Multinational companies used the freed up domestic earnings to 
invest in prohibited actions, such as stock buybacks and dividends (Dharmapala, Foley, &
Forbes, 2010). Multinational companies were explicitly not allowed to use the repatriated 
earnings for shareholder payouts. Research reveals that for every dollar that was repatriated, 
sixty to ninety-two cents were used as payouts to shareholders (Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes, 
2010). Another study claims that, of the $292 billion that was repatriated, only 20.87% was used 
for stock repurchases, which is approximately $61 billion (Blouin and Krull, 2008). Faulkender 
and Peterson discuss an opposing view point that the increase in shareholder payouts was not due 
to the 2004 tax holiday, but instead to an increasing trend of shareholder payouts (Dharmapala, 
Foley, & Forbes, 2010). Multinational companies’ actions did not violate the written content of 
the AJCA, but an argument can be made that multinational companies did violate the spirit of the 
AJCA.
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Arguments For and Against Another Holiday
An argument can be made that in the short-term there was a significant benefit from the 
2004 tax holiday by repatriating foreign earnings, but in the long-term the 2004 tax holiday was 
a complete failure.
There was not a very significant short-term benefit from the 2004 tax holiday. The first 
failure from the 2004 tax holiday was that it did not create long-term increases in employment. 
As discussed above, the 2004 tax holiday increased employment because many of the 
multinational companies created domestic projects requiring an increase in employment. The 
negative was that the increase in employment was not a “net” increase because the number of 
employees that multinational companies fired was greater than the number of jobs created. Those 
that oppose another tax holiday argue that the first reason against a second holiday is because the 
first holiday failed to create jobs.
The second and more persistent argument that opponents of another tax holiday make is 
that the tax holiday inspired more multinational companies to invest abroad, waiting for another 
tax holiday. According to Brennan (2010), “the long-term result has been an aggregate increase 
in new foreign earnings added to the overseas stockpile that is greater than the amount of funds 
repatriated pursuant to the holiday. From this perspective, it seems that the AJCA may have been 
a net failure in achieving the policy goal of returning foreign earnings to the United States.” On 
March 19,2013, Forbes stated that in 2012 multinational companies had reached $1.45 trillion, 
as stated above (Fontevecchia, 2013). The Washington Post describes a report by J.P. Morgan 
that estimates foreign earnings have increased to $1.7 trillion. This article was published on 
March 26, 2013 (Yang, 2013). There are two lessons to be learned from these two different 
estimates. The first lesson is that the estimates of the total amount companies have stored 
overseas vary. The second and more important lesson is that regardless of the estimate used a 
significant amount of earnings remain stored abroad. The fact that companies are storing funds 
abroad would not be such an upsetting concept for people except that multinational companies 
are, through the use of accounting concepts, claiming that the revenue is earned abroad; but in 
economic terms the revenue is actually attributable in the United States (Marr, Highsmith,
Huang, 2011).
Contrary to the second argument, multinational companies might not be storing funds 
overseas in the anticipation of another tax holiday. A survey in which companies were asked
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their opinion about another tax holiday provided the following results. The survey found that 
29% of multinational companies believe there is a 0% chance of another tax holiday; 65% 
believe that there is a 0-50% chance of another tax holiday; and only 5% believe that there is a 
greater than 50% chance of another tax holiday (Graham. Hanlon, Shevlin, 2010). Marr. 
Highsmith, & Haung describe in Figure 1 how multinational companies do not need a tax 
holiday to repatriate funds because from 2006 to 2010 multinational companies have repatriated 
over $600 billion and paid the taxes on the repatriated earnings (Marr. Highsmith. Huang, 2011). 
However multinational companies continue to store earnings abroad. The logical question is why 
are multinational companies storing funds abroad if they are not waiting for another holiday?
The research does not provide a definitive answer. One answer could be that multinational 
companies are receiving higher returns on investments abroad compared to domestic 
investments. The problem is that multinational companies have admitted that they are not getting 
higher returns, but instead that they are accepting low;er returns on foreign investments compared 
to investments in the U.S. (Fleischer, 2012).
F ig u re  1
Firms Have Repatriated Large Sums Since Original Tax Holiday
Earnings distributed to U.S. companies from foreign subsidiaries, in billions of 2010 dollars
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Marr. Highsmith, & Huang (2011).
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N ew  Id eas
The increasing federal deficit and unemployment rate have many arguing for the 
implementation of another tax holiday or significant tax reform. Since 2004, there have been 
numerous recommendations on how to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of another 
tax holiday. Some people recommend creating a system in which multinational companies are 
penalized for not repatriating their earnings. Some researchers have recommended implementing 
a territorial system, while others have recommended implementing a well-designed worldwide 
system.
Implementing a New Tax Holiday
The first idea is being proposed by John Klotsche. He recommends implementing another 
tax holiday for six months. The funds returned would be taxed at 5.25% and multinational 
companies would agree that, for every $10 million that a company returns, they will create a 
specific number of “net” jobs. If the multinational company fails to create the jobs, the funds 
returned will be taxed at the standard 35%. He argues that the reason multinational companies 
will return the funds at 5.25% instead of leaving the funds abroad is because “they are running 
out of uses for their oversized pile of foreign reserves.. .CEOs see the political wisdom of not 
being branded as unpatriotic “outsourcers” in a down US economy” (Klotsche, 2011). Klotsche 
says that this idea will gain support from both political parties. It will gain conservative support 
because “House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, among others, enthusiastically embraces the 
repatriation idea and will likely hail your program as a job creating "tax cut" -  yet one that 
actually raises tax revenues” (Klotsche, 2011). He claims the holiday will gain liberal support if 
the President uses the repatriated tax revenues to implement his ““infrastructure bank”...New 
York Sen. Charles Schumer (D) has suggested this, and it is a clever way to soften-up some of 
the "anti-repatriation" Democrats who chastise such plans as a corporate "giveaway"” (Klotsche, 
2011).
Robert Bloink’s idea for a tax holiday is similar to Klotsche’s, except that his idea has 
more penalties for noncompliance. His idea is for any new holiday to have a defined objective 
with “verifiable and administrable benchmarks...The holiday also must include “trust through 
verification” mechanics and reporting requirements” (Bloink, 2012). His recommendation is to 
use job creation because it is easily verified and it will create multiple revenue streams from the
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income taxes of the individuals that are hired using the repatriated earnings. There will also be a 
clause in Bloink’s (2012) idea in which multinational companies that failed to create the required 
number of jobs would be faced with one of two penalizing options. The first method would be to 
require the multinational company to pay the entire repatriation deduction if the multinational 
company fails to achieve its employment requirement even by one job. A less severe option 
would be to tax the repatriated earnings only to the extent that actual job creation did not meet 
required employment creation (Bloink, 2012).
Penalize Multinational Companies
David Cay Johnston won a Pulitzer for his reporting on the U.S. tax code. His solution to 
the U.S. economic and fiscal problems is to incentivize multinational companies to repatriate 
funds by punishing them if they do not repatriate. His solution was proposed to require 
repatriation by the end of 2011, which is why his recommendation is based on earnings earned 
prior to 2010. His solution was that all multinational companies can repatriate earnings at 35%, 
the standard rate, or when they repatriate earnings earned prior to 2010 the earnings would be 
repatriated at 50%. His logic is that if multinational companies do not repatriate their foreign 
earnings the federal government will raise $700 billion, “slashing the deficit this fiscal year 
[2011] by 63 percent” (Johnston, 2011).
Territorial System
President Obama has stated that he is willing to consider the implementation of a 
territorial system (Dixon, 2013). A territorial system is based on a simple concept: the revenue 
that is earned in one jurisdiction is taxed only by that jurisdiction. The same concept applies for 
expenses. All expenses recognized in one jurisdiction are deducted only in that jurisdiction. This 
would eliminate the repatriation tax because the federal government could no longer tax those 
earnings because they were earned in another jurisdiction (Lokken, 2006). This would provide a 
significant benefit to the U.S. economy if multinational companies decide to use the funds that 
they can repatriate untaxed to invest in the U.S. through job creation, research and development, 
project investments, etc. This taxation system would prevent the federal government from 
gaining any direct monetary reward from the returning of the foreign earnings; but if 
multinational companies decide to invest domestically they will create jobs or taxable revenue 
which will benefit the government. One cost of this tax system is that it will require closer
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observation of transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is a buyer-seller relationship within a 
corporation. It is most effective as a tax planning technique because there is significant 
ambiguity about what is an appropriate price for the sale of the goods or services between related 
companies. For example, assume a multinational company has two subsidiaries one of which 
buys materials and the other sells the materials to the other subsidiary. The best way for a 
multinational company to benefit from transfer pricing is when the seller subsidiary is located in 
an extremely low tax jurisdiction because the sale of the materials will be taxed at an extremely 
low rate. The buyer subsidiary will be able to deduct the expense of purchasing those materials 
on their tax return. The territorial system would incentivize multinational companies to locate 
seller subsidiaries in lower tax jurisdictions to gain significant revenue while keeping the 
multinational company total tax rate low.
Worldwide System
A worldwide (full inclusion) system that is being proposed has the best of both the 
current U.S. tax system and the territorial system. The benefit a worldwide tax methodology 
shares with the U.S. tax system is that all income is taxed regardless of the jurisdiction in which 
the income is earned. The benefit it shares with a territorial system is that revenue is taxed when 
earned, not repatriated. The benefit of taxing revenue when earned is that “ (1) the distortive bias 
in favor of locating business activity in low-tax foreign jurisdictions would be eliminated, (2) the 
repatriation tax barrier would be removed and (3) the incentive to engage in aggressive transfer 
pricing with respect to outbound activity would be substantially reduced” (Fleming Jr., Peroni, 
and Shay, 2009). A full inclusion system would lower the tax rates while expanding the tax base 
(Novack, 2013). This method responds to multinational companies’ agreement that they are 
uncompetitive because of the high U.S. tax rate. The U.S. would have a choice about whether to 
allow for the deduction of foreign taxes paid.
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John Klotsche’s idea to implement another tax holiday
Pros Cons
Returns foreign earnings Loss of tax revenue because returned at lower 
rate
Increase in net jobs Inspires multinational companies to send funds 
abroad in expectation of another tax holiday
Robert Bloink’s idea to implement another tax holiday
Returns foreign earnings Loss of tax revenue because returned at lower 
rate
Increase in net jobs Inspires multinational companies to send funds 
abroad in expectation of another tax holiday
Steep penalties for noncompliance with job 
creation requirements
David Cay Johnston’s idea to penalize companies for not repatriating
Incentivizing multinational companies to 
repatriate at the standard 35%
Forcing multinational companies to repatriate 
earnings
Raised 700 billion in tax revenue if 
multinational companies do not repatriate
Angering multinational companies 
incentivizing them to consider moving out of 
the United States
Territorial System
The repatriation tax is no longer an issue Loss of all foreign earnings as taxable revenue 
in U.S.
Multinational companies no longer have a 
reason to store earnings abroad
Inspires more use of transfer pricing requiring 
more investigation
No longer need to deduct taxes paid in other 
jurisdiction from U.S. tax return
No longer allowed to use foreign deductions on 
U.S. tax return
Worldwide System
Taxes all income when earned Very complex
Removes incentive to locate in foreign 
jurisdictions
Choice of federal government to allow for 
deduction of foreign taxes paid
Repatriation tax is removed
Lower tax rates
Incentive for aggressive transfer pricing will be 




There does not appear to be a complete solution that will benefit everyone and cannot be 
exploited. The U.S. is facing a significant problem because the country is operating at over a 
trillion dollar deficit. The U.S. is losing tax revenue because of the ability for multinational 
companies to store earnings abroad and the federal government’s inability to persuade 
multinational companies to repatriate earnings. There is over $1.45 trillion in foreign earnings 
stored abroad. Even though multinational companies do not believe there will be another tax 
holiday they are continuing to increase the amount of earnings they store abroad. Multinational 
companies are utilizing very complex accounting methods for the sole purpose of providing 
documentation that their earnings were earned in a foreign jurisdiction when in reality the profits 
were earned from U.S. sales. The 2004 tax holiday did repatriate $292 billion in foreign 
earnings. The discussion of taxes creates very passionate responses which create numerous 
proposals to improve and correct the mistakes of others. Some of the proposals were to have 
another tax holiday with more restrictions and requirements for multinational companies to 
return foreign earnings at a lower rate. The proposals were not limited to implementing another 
tax holiday, but the proposals had recommendations for changing the U.S. tax system to a 
territorial system or a worldwide system. The pros and cons of these ideas are presented in the 
following table.
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A ppendix B: Source Sum m aries
The Tax Effect on Cash
Apple (AAPL) could owe $28B on foreign cash holdings
By: WSP
Date: Jan. 8, 2013
The article describes how because of apple’s growth, the company by September 2013 will owe 
approximately 155 billion in taxes. The article describes how there are $1,375 trillion in profit 
overseas that has not been taxed.
Barriers to mobility: the lockout effect of U.S. taxation of worldwide corporate profits
By: John R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon, & Terry Shevlin 
Date: Aug. 25, 2010
This paper is a self-reported study by firms that repatriated money from foreign subsidiaries. The 
results of the survey show multinationals firms go to great lengths to avoid paying the repatriated 
taxes. Some of the sacrifices firms are willing to make are to accept lower returns on investment, 
actually selling the company or segment and for the majority of firms incur more debt to finance 
new investments. The second major conclusion from the study is companies used the money that 
was repatriated for the purposes required and the majority of freed up cash was used for debt 
payoffs and stock repurchases. The third major conclusion is American based companies feel at 
an extreme disadvantage compared to foreign companies because of repatriated taxes.
Dodging Repatriation Tax Lets U.S. Companies Bring Home Cash
By: Jesse Drucfcer 
Date: Dec. 28, 2010
This article describes the different methods companies use to repatriate funds. It also provides a 
list of companies to research and review their financial statements to discover how much money 
is stored overseas in foreign subsidiaries.
IRS End Deals that let Companies Avoid Repatriation Tax
By: Richard Rubin 
Date: July 13, 2012
This articles describes the two common methods companies use to avoid taxes. The first 
technique is the selling of a patent to a foreign subsidiary. The second method is to buy a 
company in the U.S. with foreign funds and then move the newly bought company overseas.
Multinational corporations shift more profits offshore.
By: Michael Cohn 
Date: Mar. 12, 2013
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This article describes how in the last year ten U.S. multinational companies have increased its 
foreign earnings by $5 billion or more. The article continues and describes how 92 of the Fortune 
500 corporations have each increased their foreign holdings by over $500 million. 300 of the 
Fortune 500 corporations have disclosed in their financial statements that they have funds stored 
abroad totaling $1.6 trillion at the end of 2011.
Overseas Cash and the tax games multinationals play
By: Victor Fleischer 
Date: Oct. 3, 2012
This article describes how companies are keeping their funds overseas and are claiming on their 
financial statements that they are investing directly into the foreign country to avoid claiming a 
tax liability. The other important piece of information is that it provides an insight about the 
extent business leaders will go to avoid paying excessive repatriation taxes because businesses 
that invest purely for tax reason are accept a lower return on investment by investing in foreign 
subsidiaries instead of returning the funds and using the capital in the United States.
Revealed: How U.S. companies can repatriate cash tax free
By: Eric Savitz 
Date: Nov. 13, 2012
This article describes the only way companies can bring money back into this country is by 
having negative income. The companies need to be unprofitable to bring their money back 
without being taxed on it.
Summary of 2004 Tax Holiday
Bringing it home: A study of the incentives surrounding the repatriation of foreign 
earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
By: Jennifer Blouin and Linda Krull 
Date: July 2008
This study discusses that firms will only repatriate funds when the after tax cost of investing in 
the domestic economy is less than the combined after tax cost of foreign investment and the 
repatriation tax on funds. The second theory this study provides is that multinational firms have 
too much excess cash, which causes them to overinvest in a project. The study further explains 
the reason that multinational companies prefer stock repurchased instead of stock dividends. One 
of the figures in the study describes the amount of money that was returned because of the tax 
holiday. The figure describes the percentage increase of repatriations compared to GDP. Another 
important discovery from the study is firms do not repatriate funds solely because of large 
accumulations of cash. The study also reveals that of the 292 billion that was repatriated only 
20.87% was used for repurchases of stock. The results from the study suggest that only 75% of 
the 2004-2005 stock repurchase increase was due the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
Chemical Makers Stand to Benefit from Tax Overhaul
By: Robert Westervelt &Kara Sissell 
Date: Mar. 16, 2005
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The article describes chemical company’s intention to repatriate funds if a tax holiday were 
implemented. There is also some description of how vague the language is concerning what 
companies need to use the money for to prevent the federal government from taxing the 
repatriated funds.
Is United States corporate tax policy outsourcing America? A critical analysis of the 
proposed tax holiday for trapped CFC earnings
By: Robert Bloink 
Date: Mar. 21, 2012
This article provides a summary of the 2004 tax holiday. The summary explains why the 2004 
tax holiday failed. There is also a figure describing how much the top six companies repatriated 
and the number of employees laid off. The second half of the article proposes a theory for a 
second holiday, but a method to close all the loopholes from the 2004 tax holiday. Bloink 
solution is a solution in which multinational corporations are allowed to return funds at a lower 
tax rate in exchange for hiring more employees. Unlike the 2004 Act, this solution has steep 
penalties for failure to complete the requirements of the solution and verifiable checks ensuring 
compliance with the principles of the solution.
Just the facts: the costs of a repatriation tax holiday
By: Michael Mundaca 
Date: Mar. 23, 2011
This article is a posting by a member of the Treasury Department. In the article he describes the 
ineffectiveness of the 2004 tax holiday.
Qualcomm lobbies government to get out of paying taxes
By: John Lawrence 
Date: Jan. 7, 2013
The articles provide a detailed description of how Qualcomm used the 2004 tax holiday to 
repatriate funds. It also describes the amount of money that Qualcomm used to lobby for a tax 
holiday in 2011 and 2012.
Study tax break didn’t create jobs
By: Paul Davidson 
Date: Oct. 12, 2011
This is a newspaper article summary describing why the 2004 tax holiday failed. The reason for 
the failure was because many companies that repatriated money did not create jobs, but instead 
eliminated jobs, based on a senate study.
Watch what I do, not what I say: The unintended consequences of the Homeland 
Investment Act
By: Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley & Kristin J. Forbes
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Date: June 4, 2010
The study reveals that many firms that utilized the Homeland Investment Act also used round 
tripping, which is the process of parent companies moving money into foreign subsidiaries and 
then repatriating the money back to the U.S. at a lower tax rate. The study estimates that for 
every dollar that was repatriated $0.60-$0.92 was used as payouts to shareholders which were 
specifically prohibited under the HIA. The study also revealed higher repatriations did not result 
in higher management compensation. Another important result from the study was that it 
revealed the government regulations concerning the use of repatriated funds were entirely 
ineffective because of the fungibility of money. The study also theorizes the money repatriated 
could have been used to pay for projects that were already planned, which released cash for 
payouts to shareholders. An opposing view point in the study by Faulkender and Peterson reveal 
the increase in shareholder payout could result from a trend of increases in equity payouts. The 
study also performs a survey of 400 tax executives that revealed only 6% of firms that repatriated 
funds did not invest in projects because capitals was trapped overseas. The study provides an 
excellent explanation of how repatriation taxes are utilized. The study states firms would return 
more profits if there were not any repatriated taxes. The study concludes were the majority of the 
funds that were repatriated were used for payouts to shareholders, instead of domestic 
investment.
What happens after a holiday?: Long-term effects of the repatriation provisions of the 
AJCA
By: Thomas J. Brennan
Date: Oct SO, 2010
This is a study with the objective of evaluating whether the 2004 tax holiday created a behavioral 
response in which multinational companies expect another holiday and as a result are investing 
more in foreign subsidiaries waiting for another tax holiday. The study reveals the increase in 
cash inflows from the 2004 tax holiday has already been offset by the increase in foreign 
investing by multinational firms. The short-term perspective of the tax holiday was not very 
effective because substantial amounts of funds where returned to the United States, but in the 
long-term was a complete failures because it created a condition response of firms investing 
abroad waiting for the next holiday. The study reviewed seventy-three different firms across 
eight industries to evaluate the effectiveness or failure of the 2004 tax holiday. One of the figures 
from the study reveals multinational firms had a significant increase in post-holiday reinvesting 
in foreign subsidiaries. The study indicates there was an increase in permanently foreign invested 
earnings, but it could be because of reclassifying the earnings, increase in foreign earnings, or the 
combination of both. The study concluded that there is statistical correlation, but not causation 
for its findings.
Ideas for Handling Tax Repatriation
A tax holiday for big business that both liberals and conservatives can get behind
By: John Klotsche
Date: Aug. 31, 2011
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This article describes a tax repatriation idea that is bi-partisan and clarifies and improves the 
language avoiding the mistakes of the 2004 tax holiday.
Obama might back territorial tax system: business chief
By: Kim Dixon 
Date: Jan. 31, 2013
The news article introduces the idea that President Obama is willing to implement a territorial 
system to lower the tax rate in exchange for concession on his budget.
Some perspective from the United States on the worldwide taxation vs. territorial taxation 
debate
By: J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Sephen E. Shay 
Date: July 22, 2009
According to the article the United States current tax system is based on an approach in which it 
taxes both domestic and foreign-source income. The problem with this system is it increases the 
complexity of the taxation system without an increase in income. This article advocates for a 
worldwide system instead of a new “well-designed exemption” system (p. 4). The article does a 
comparison between implementing a territorial system instead of a worldwide system. A 
territorial system is easier, and unlike the U.S. current taxation system, it is not as lenient to 
companies. A worldwide system would prevent multinational firms from deferring revenue by 
establishing foreign subsidiaries because the revenue would be taxed when it is earned instead of 
when it is repatriated. Since multinational firms could no longer prevent revenue from being 
taxed by storing it abroad it would remove the need for a repatriation tax and it would decrease 
the aggressiveness in applying transfer pricing. The implementation of a territorial system has 
some of the same problems that the United States is currently facing with its current taxation 
system. A territorial system will distort business decisions because companies will decide to 
locate in areas with the lowest tax rate. The new worldwide system would prevent shareholders 
in foreign companies from avoiding any tax because shareholders would be taxed on their share 
in the company regardless of their percentage.
Tax Cuts: Different Things to Different Parties
By: Nancy Cook 
Date: Sept. 17, 2011
The articles describe the two different objectives in politics concerning how to fix the economy. 
The Republican Party wants to implement tax repatriation and a complete overhaul of the tax 
code. The Democratic Party wants to implement tax cuts. The article further describes how 
Republicans will agree on tax cuts, but only in exchange for a complete reform of the tax code. 
Republicans are against any increase in spending.
Tax repatriation
By: David Cay Johnston 
Date: Oct. 19, 2011
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This article describes the negative effects of implementing another tax holiday. The article also 
proposes another method to incentivize multinational corporations to repatriate their foreign 
earnings back to the United States by penalizing them if the corporations fail to repatriate the 
funds.
Territorial taxation: why some U.S. multinationals may be less than enthusiastic about the 
idea (and some ideas they really dislike)
By: Lawrence Lokken
Date: Oct. 19, 2006
This paper discusses the proposition of the Advisory Panel on Tax Reform about the benefits and 
costs of implementing an exemption tax system. The two main arguments for implementing an 
exemption system is that businesses are making decisions based on the tax effects not what is 
most profitable, and the current system is more profitable for multinational firms than a 
territorial system. This method works by taxing income only in the jurisdiction in which it is 
earned. It does not allow for deductions based on other jurisdictions income. This new tax 
system will require extra concern and investigation when transfer pricing is involved because of 
the inherent ability of transfer pricing to distort revenue and expenses. The research found that 
there will be no incentive for the creation of U.S. jobs or investment compared to the current 
system. As with any system, there will be legal technicalities for corporations to exploit to 
decrease their tax liability that will need to be investigated.
